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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
IV. RELATION TO THE PATIENT.
Assuming that the holding that the relation of the
physician and nurse is that of master and servant, 5 it
does not follow that because the doctor or master is personally liable for the negligence of the nurse or servant
that the nurse it not also personally liable. The contrary
is the law, and it is a general rule that a servant is per-

sonally liable for injuries resulting from his negligence2 6
The degree of care and skill required of physicians and
surgeons is not the highest possible, but only that which
is reasonable and ordinary, and in determining the standard of care and skill which the law requires, the state of
2
scientific knowledge at the time must be considered. T
Nurses should be liable to no higher degree of care than
physicians or surgeons. The same standard of care would
seem to be applicable relative to the duties of a nurse toward the patient, as those of a physician toward the
patient.
NICHOLAS UNKOVIC.

NECESSARY TESTAMENTARY PROVISION
AFTER-BORN CHILDREN

FOR

1
Section 21 of the Wills Act as amended, provides as
follows "When any person, male or female, shall make a
last will and testament, and afterward shall marry, or shall
have a child or children, either by birth or by adoption, not
provided for in such will, and shall die leaving a surviving
spouse and such child or children, or either a surviving
spouse or such child or children, although such child or
children be born after the death of their father, every such
25

Supra, note 21.
Labatt's Master & Servant sec. 2580 et. seq.
2TWohlert v. Seibert, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 213 (1903); Howard v.
Grover, 28 Me. 97, 48 Am. Dec. 478 (1848); 29 Yale L. J. 684, 5; Barnard v. Schell, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 329 (1924); 48 C. J. 1113.
267

11921, P. L. 937, Sec. 1.
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person so far as shall regard the surviving spouse, or
children born or. adopted after the making of the will,
shall be deemed and construed to die intestate; and such
surviving spouse, child or children shall be entitled to such
purparts, shares and dividends of the estate,. real and
personal, of the deceased, as if such testator had actually
died without any will."
There is no doubt under this section that where a testator makes a will, and afterwards has a child or children
not contemplated, nor provided for by him, in such will,
that as to such child or children, the testator will be
deemed to have died intestate. Nor is it doubted that when
an actual provision is made for after-born children by the
testator, that such after-born children will take according
to the will and not according to the intestate law. The
pertinent question to be discussed herein is, where a testator
makes a will, and, in anticipation of after-born children,
provides that such children are to be disinherited, will the
courts in such a case carry out the intention of the testator
and disinherit the children or will the courts disregard
such intention and permit such children to inherit as if the
testator had died intestate.
The case of McIlvain's Estate, 2 discusses this specific
question. In that case one Biddle gave all his estate to his
wife absolutely, providing further, that the devise to the
wife would take effect notwithstanding the birth of any
children born later. He said that it was his intention to disinherit all after-born children. Four children survived, two
of whom were born after the execution of the will. The
court held that the will failed as far as these two children
were concerned. As to them he died intestate.
It is true that a will, which, as here, expresses an intention to disinherit after-born children certainly is not
making a provision for them. It does exactly the opposite.
It is also true that the statute makes no requirement that
the child shall be fully or equally provided for therein. All
that it does require is that the testator shall have the child
22 D. & C. 501 (1922).
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in mind and shall make clear his intention that there is
some actual provision made for it. But such a construction of the act is clearly contrary to the theory upon
which such statutes were founded. This theory is that the
unborn child was not in the contemplation of the testator
when he made his will and that, if it had been, he would
have changed its provisions. As is shown by the historical
retrospect of the development of the testamentary power
in England, the basis of the rule as to revocation of wills
by the subsequent marriage and birth of children to the
testator is the latter's implied intention as to his disposition of his property under such a change of circumstances.3
In other words, if the circumstances of the testator's family are materially changed after the execution of his will,
his will ceases to represent his testamentary intention, and
is, therefore, to be considered as revoked pro tanto. The
evil designed to be remedied is the unintentional disherism
by the testator of a child who has a natural moral claim
to recognition.
Irrespective however, of the intention of the testator
and the theory upon which this section was passed, the
courts have invariably decided that the words of the
statute must be strictly construed. By doing so they have
avoided many evils which might otherwise have arisen.
The subject can be more clearly discussed by an historical survey of this section of the Wills Act. Under the
common law which we inherited from England, the subsequent birth of a child did not revoke a will previously
made, nor, indeed, did the subsequent marriage of the
testator, but the marriage and the birth of the child conjointly had that effect. These circumstances produced such
a total change in the testator's situation as to lead to a
presumption that he could not intend his previous testamentary disposition to remain unchanged.
This English common law rule was altered, however,
3Newlin's

498, (1878).

Estate, 209 Pa. 456, (1904); Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn.
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in Pennsylvania, by the Act of Feb. 4, 1748-9,' which provided that when a testator should afterward marry or
have a child or children "not named in any such will", the
testator should, so far as regards such child or children, be
deemed to die intestate, etc. By the Act of March 23,
1764,5 there were substituted for the words "not named in
any such will", the words, "not provided for in any such
will", and this Act was substantially re-enacted by the
Acts of April 10, 1794,8 and April 8, 1833,1 and June 7, 1917,8
which continue this language. The earlier Act of 1748-9,
therefore, revoked the will where an after-born child was
not "named in the will", which means, so far as a nonexistent child can be named, there must be something to
show that the testator had in mind the possibility of its
birth. This was changed by the later acts, as has been seen,
and our courts have judiciously held that the amount of
such provision must be left to the discretion of the testator, otherwise the contests that would arise, if the discretion of the court were substituted for that of the testator, would be interminable.
Thus we have seen that the inconveniences resulting
from the state of the common law, produced this section of
the Wills Act and that under the common law, marriage
alone and birth of children alone were not sufficient to
operate as a revocation of a will previously made and that
however strongly the courts favored such children, they
could not set aside a solemn will because no provision was
made for these children. The legislature by the Act of
1748 pursued a more equitable system and one better calculated to carry into execution what might be supposed
reasonably to be the dictates of an honest mind. "So far
as shall regard the widow, or child or children after-born,
the testator shall be deemed and construed to die intestate." So forcibly were the lawmakers struck with the
'5 St. at. L. 64, Section 5.
53 Sm. Laws 160, Sect. 4.
63 Sm. Laws 152, Sect. 23.
7Sect. 15, P. L. 251.
eSect. 21, P. L. 403.
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propriety of this provision that they gave it retrospective
operation as to all wills made from and after the fourth
day of February, 1748.'
Our present Act is a positive statutory enactment
which can neither be refuted by parol testimony, outside
of the will, nor by any language in the will raising a presumption that he did not intend to provide for such afterborn child. It is proper to give this effect to the well
weighed words of our Act concerning a provision for a
child, whose interests may be sacrificed to a mere stranger,
by giving a forced meaning to this plain and clear
language.' 0
In Mcllvain's Estate," the intention of the testator was
indeed plain enough, and the after-born children, being
named in the will, would have been excluded under the old
law prior to the act of 1764, but under the present statute,
requiring a provision to be made for an after-born child,
the law was held to be otherwise. If the testator expressly disinherits after-born children, how can he be said to
have provided for them? He says in so many words that
he makes no provision for them.

2

Many other cases in this jurisdiction show that the
intention of the testator is not enough to satisfy the
statute. All hold that there must be some provision made
for the children, however slight, its amount and nature being determined by the testator.
A will by a testator, made in anticipation of afterborn children, whereby he gave his entire estate to his
wife "having utmost confidence in her integrity and belief
that should a child be born to us, she will do the utmost to
rear it in the honor and glory of its parents", was revoked
pro tanto because there was no actual provision made for
the child. 8 An estate in remainder or a reversionary interest, whether vested or contingent, was held not to be'a
9Coates

v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 498, (1878).
loWalker v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483, (180).
112 D. & C. 501 (1922).
12Smith's Estate, 14 D. & C 271 (1930).
1 8Walker

v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483 (1860).
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provision for an after-born child within the spirit of the
statute." A will by a testator whereby he gave his entire
estate to his wife with a provision, that if he leave any
children, he appointed his wife guardian, committing their
maintenance, education and future provision to her, adding, "which guardianship I intend and consider to be a
suitable and proper provision for such child or children",
was held to be clearly no provision for his children such as
is contemplated by the Wills Act and the whole policy of
the law.' 5
In Newlin's Estate,18 one Newlin gave his trustees onethird of his estate, to pay the income to his wife during
the minority of his children, if during the period the wife
should remain unmarried, with the remainder to his daughter. A child was expected when the will was made. The
court held that the Act of 1833 made no requirement that
the child shall be fully provided for. True it is that Mr.
Chief Justice Mitchell says that "all that it (the act) does
require is that the testator shall have the child in mind
and shall make clear his intention that the will shall apply
to it." The context shows that the meaning of the expression, "the will shall apply to it" means making some provision for the child. In that case the real question was as
to the sufficiency of the provision and it was held that
the fact of provision and not the sufficiency thereof was
the test. The statute makes no requirement as to adequacy and gives courts no authority over that subject.
7 this interpretation was reiteratIn Randall v. Dunlap,"
ed. In that case, the children, if any, took only upon condition that the husband failed to survive the wife, and the
will stated in terms that the provision, which in fact and
effect, turned out to be none at all, as the husband did
"Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 114, (1864); Willard's Est. 68 Pa. 327,
(1872).
15Hollingsworth's Appeal, 51 Pa. 518, (1867); also see Iron's
Estate, 13 Pa. Dist. 338, (1904).
'oNewlin's Estate, 209 Pa. 456 (1904).

17218 Pa. 210, (1907).
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survive, was intended to cover the case of after-born
children.""
There appears to be only one case in this jurisdiction
which has attempted to carry out the intention of the
testator in disinheriting after-born children and thus disregarding the absolute provisions of the Statute.19 In that
case, the testator, anticipating the birth of a child, stated,
in a codicil to his will that his wife was the sole heir and
that the birth of a child should in io wise disturb the disposition of his estate as directed in his will. The Court was
of the opinion that under Walker v. Hall,2" and Hollingsworth's Estate,"' and the other cases referred to, the will
must be held to be revoked, but expressed the opinion that
Newlin's Estate,2 2 marked a new road, and held that the will
was not revoked.
It is true that the Court in Newlin's Estate said that all
the statute requires is that the "testator shall have the
child in mind and make clear his intention that the will
shall apply to it;" but the court went on to say, what is not
quoted in Zug's Estate, that "any provision which does that
is sufficient, and the inquiry whether it be small or large,
equal or unequal, vested or contingent, is irrelevant and
outside the jurisdiction of the courts, except so far as it
tends to throw light upon the question of intention. 128 But
where the will not only makes no provision at all for an
after-born child but even expressly says that the testator
disinherits the child, how can such a will be said to provide
for the child in the language of the act of assembly, in
which there are significantly used the words, "not provided
for", instead of "not named"? Newlin's Estate does not go
as far as that and could not without overruling the prior
cases of Walker v. Hall and especially Hollingsworth's Appeal, in both of which the intention of the testator clearly
Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 29, (1916).
Zug's Estate, 57 Pitts L. J. 176.

lSConn's

19

Pa. 483, (1860).
Pa. 518, (1867).
22209 Pa. 456, (1904).
2034
2151

2BRafndall v. Dunlap, 218 Pa. 210, (1922).
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appeared to give his entire estate to his wife, even if a child
or children should afterward be born, whose possible birth
was referred to. As previously said, these cases show
that the intention of the testator is not enough to satisfy
the statute; there must be some provision made for the
children, however slight, its amount and nature being determined by the testator.2 '
CONCLUSION
Although one of the personal rights of an individual,
still safeguarded, is the right to dispose of his property by
last will as his judgment dictates, it is subject to a few
statutes limiting the absolute control of one's estate. For
illustration, giving to a widow the right to take against her
husband's will and vice versa, and the statute wherein marriage or birth of a child is sufficient to effect a pro tanto
revocation of the will previously made. The statute being
in derogation of the testator's testamentary right, must be
25
construed according to its terms.
As a result of Section 21 of the present Wills Act two
things follow: The after-born child must be provided for,
i. e., the mention of the fact that testator has such child in
mind is not sufficient; and if any provision is made, its
character and amount are of no moment.28
Thus an attempt by a testator to absolutely disinheriL
after-born children will be entirely disregarded but if he
makes the slightest provision for such after-born children,
this will be deemed sufficient to satisfy the statute.
It is clear therefore, that all our rules in such cases are
statutory ones, established by the legislature by which the
common law rule has either been repealed or altered or enforced by positive legislative sanction, and therefore is not
open to the doctrine of implied presumption.
ALEXANDER DENBO.
2

'Mcllvain's Estate, 2 D. & C. 501, (1922).
Alburger's Estate, No. 1, 274 Pa. 10, (1922).
26Conn's Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 29, (1916).
25

